Skidmore College

Creative Matter
Sociology Senior Seminar Papers

Sociology

2018

Religious Mobility in the United States: The Effects of Income and
Economic Mobility on Religious Conversion
Ruby Thompson
Skidmore College, rthomps1@skidmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/socio_stu_stu_schol
Part of the Sociology of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Thompson, Ruby, "Religious Mobility in the United States: The Effects of Income and Economic Mobility
on Religious Conversion" (2018). Sociology Senior Seminar Papers. 9.
https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/socio_stu_stu_schol/9

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology at Creative Matter. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Sociology Senior Seminar Papers by an authorized administrator of Creative Matter. For more
information, please contact dseiler@skidmore.edu.

Running Head = ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS MOBILITY

Religious Mobility in the United States: The Effects of Income and Economic Mobility on
Religious Conversion*

Ruby Thompson
Skidmore College

Word Count = 10,413
*Please direct all correspondence to Ruby Thompson, 815 N. Broadway, Skidmore College,
Saratoga Springs, NY 12866. E-mail: rthomps1@skidmore.edu. I would like to acknowledge and
thank Professor Emeka, Professor Berheide, and Professor Lindner for their support, aid, and
encouragement throughout this project. I would also like to acknowledge Jiebei Luo for her help
in transforming the income variable and measuring economic mobility.

Religious Mobility in the United States: The Effects of Income and Economic Mobility on
Religious Conversion
ABSTRACT
Why do people switch religions? Under the theoretical framework of interactionism
theory of conversion, which posits that the interplay between active, negotiated, and socially
constructed aspects of human behavior and different aspects of social context lead to religious
conversion, I propose that economic mobility and income affect whether or not one chooses to
switch religions from the one in which they were raised. I rely on the 2016 General Social
Survey (GSS) that was administered to 2,867 randomly selected adults living in households in
the United States in 2016. I analyze data from a subset of 1,068 married respondents to examine
the effects of economic mobility, income, exogamy, geographic mobility, education, race, age,
and sex on religious mobility and apostasy. There are no significant correlations between
economic mobility and income with religious mobility or apostasy. The only significant
predictor of religious mobility and apostasy is exogamy. Respondents who have married outside
of the religion in which they were raised are more likely to be religiously mobile or abandon
religion altogether than those who are endogamous. Additionally, older respondents are less
likely to abandon religion than younger respondents. My hypothesis is not supported. However,
the results support interactionism theory of conversion as exogamy is a significant predictor of
religious mobility. These results confirm that the institution of marriage plays a significant role
in whether or not someone converts religions; furthermore, the bonds of marriage outweigh one’s
bond to the religion in which they were raised.
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Religious Mobility in the United States: The Effects of Income and Economic Mobility on
Religious Conversion
Over the past few decades, sociological interest in the structure, performance, and
permanence of religious affiliations has burgeoned (Kilbourne and Richardson 1989; Loveland
2003; Roof and Hadaway 1977; Snow and Machalek 1984; Straus 1979; Suchman 1992; Sherkat
1993, 2001). The concerns of Hout and Fischer (2002) about the rising rate of Americans
reporting no religious preference in less than a decade in the 1990s remains relevant today as the
answer ‘none’ in response to one’s religious affiliation on the General Social Survey (GSS) has
ranked as the third most common response over the past fifteen years. Furthermore, in response
to the question “How often do you attend religious services?” on the 1976 GSS, the modal
response from respondents was ‘every week’; however, in 2016, the modal reply was ‘never’ in
response to the same question. Recent trends of secularization and religious abandonment in the
United States have inspired sociological interest in the study of apostasy and ‘religious
switching’ in particular (Hout and Fischer 2002; Newport 1979). The influence of education
predominates literature on secularization (Hastings and Hoge 1970; Hout and Fischer 2002;
Loveland 2003), but other factors such as race, sex, exogamy, socioeconomic status and
geographic mobility have been shown to influence religiosity (Ellison and Sherkat 1990; Glenn
1982; Loveland 2003; Nelson and Clews 1973; Newport 1979). While the "none" responses for
in which religion one was raised is growing in the United States, Americans remain to be a
largely religiously affiliated, and religiously stable, population (Hayes 1996). Yet, as individuals
have the agency to switch religious affiliations, current discussion on the saliency and mobility
of religion and religious identity is ever growing.
Conversion is most broadly understood as the change from one belief to another; Lofland
and Stark (1965:862) define the process as “when a person gives up one such perspective or
3
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ordered view of the world for another.” Conversion can be a dramatic, deliberate shift from one
religion to another, or, as Nock (1933) terms, an acceptance of a new religious affiliation as a
supplemental, not substitutive, support system (Snow and Machalek 1984). While sociological
interest in conversion and religious mobility focuses on switches from one major religion to
another, both conventional and unconventional sects (Parrucci 1968), inter-denominational
change (Alston 1971; Sherkat 1991), or a revitalization of a belief system (regeneration) that had
previously not been taken seriously by the convert are also seen as types of religious conversion
(Clark 1929; Snow and Machalek 1984). Yet, the question still remains: what drives individuals
to convert?
Research on religious conversion and variables that are significantly correlated with
religious mobility in recent years can help us understand which stocks of people make the active
decision to switch religious affiliations once they enter adulthood. Developing an understanding
of conversion and its causes not only allows researchers to identify the convert (Snow and
Machalek 1984), but also to measure to what extent religious conversion is selective. While
religion may not be as salient an identity as sex or race for some individuals, understanding
religious identity and the intersections between religious affiliation, income, education, age, sex,
and other individual indicators remain a pertinent topic of sociological interest in identity and
identity formation.
Previous literature on religious mobility suggest that sex, race, years of education, age,
exogamy, religious practices, time spent with family, socioeconomic status and the
religion/denomination in which one is raised influences religious mobility (Lauer 1975;
Loveland 2003). Prior research has studied a multitude of significant predictors such as these, yet
there is a lack of recent study on the income component of socioeconomic status (Alston 1971).
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While research on the relationship between income and religion suggests that religiosity
increases in conditions of economic insecurity and declines in conditions of economic security
and prosperity (Storm 2017), little research has been done on the effects of income on religious
mobility in the United States within the last decade. And so, the purpose of this study is to
explore the effects of income and economic mobility, on religious mobility and apostasy in the
United States. My central research question is: to what extent do income and economic mobility
predict religious mobility and apostasy. Given previous literature on religious mobility and the
relationship between income and religiosity, I present the following two hypotheses:
1. Respondents who experience economic mobility (in either direction) will be more
likely to be religiously mobile than those who not experience economic mobility. Therefore I
hypothesize that respondents whose total family income in 2016 has a different value than their
estimated family income when they were 16 will be more likely to report a different religious
affiliation than the one in which they were raised than those who do not report different values of
family income from when they were 16 and in 2016.
2. Respondents whose total family income is above average in 2016 will be more likely
to abandon religion altogether than those whose total family income is below average in 2016.
Therefore I hypothesize that if the respondent was raised with a religious affiliation other than
‘none’ and their total family income is above the average family income in the year 2016, they
will be more likely to report ‘none’ for their religious preference in 2016.
THEORY
The dominant perspectives of theory of religious conversion primarily divide along four
different arguments: active role of the convert, passive role of the convert, intraindividual level
of analysis, and interindividual of analysis (Kilbourne and Richardson 1988; Sherkat 1993). In
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reference to the first two of these dissenting perspectives, theories of religious conversion remain
divided along passive and active viewpoints of the convert; researchers of religious conversion
either place emphasis on the agency of the convert or the sociological and psychological forces
that act upon the convert (Kilbourne and Richardson 1988; Sherkat 1993; Snow and Machalek
1984). In their review of theoretical approaches to religious conversion, Kilbourne and
Richardson (1988) classify the passive lens as the 'old paradigm' and the active lens as the 'new
paradigm'. The “old paradigm” (Kilbourne and Richardson 1988:1-2) of religious conversion
(passive convert) is generally characterized as “sudden and dramatic, irrational or magical in
nature, involving a powerful, external, and impersonal force, usually a single event, the negation
of the old self and the affirmation of a new self, etc.” Conversely, the “new paradigm” argues
that converts are seekers who actively make the choice to convert (Kilbourne and Richardson
1988; Straus 1979). Bridging the conflict between these two perspectives, religious conversion
can be viewed as a combination of intraindividual (e.g. personal constructs, internal states,
biology, predispositions, etc.) and interindividual levels of analysis (e.g. group influences,
societal stress, social status, anomie, etc.) (Kilbourne and Richardson 1988). Kilbourne and
Richardson (1988) propose that conversion can be best conceptualized as a form of socialization
that differs from other forms of socialization because of its focus on self-change and the
emphasis of a social audience reaction to that self-change. And so, while literature is often
divided on the subject of what drives religious conversion, a more holistic conclusion is that
religious mobility is driven from both inward and outward sociological and psychological forces.
While social-environmental determinism theories of conversion (old paradigm)
emphasize the influence of social-environmental factors, such as income, they discount the
agency of the individual and focus on the effects of arguably negative forces on converts
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(Kilbourne and Richardson 1988; Lofland and Stark 1965; Somit 1968). Furthermore, these
theories have been critiqued for their assumptions of the homogeneity of membership in new
religions and their “failure to appreciate how individuals may use groups to satisfy their quests
for identity, meaning, and community” (Kilbourne and Richardson 1988:12). Thus, while
income has been associated with conceptions of conversion under social-environmental
determinism theoretical approaches, the theoretical framework driving this study is interactionist.
This perspective not only recognizes the voluntary nature of religious conversion, but does not
negatively code what drives conversion.
Interactionist theories of religious conversion focus on “both the voluntaristic nature of
conversion and the social context of conversion” (Kilbourne and Richardson 1988:9). In regards
to the ‘voluntaristic nature’ of conversion, interactionist theories examine the “active, negotiated,
and socially constructed aspects of human behavior,” coupled with the social context of the
conversion (Kilbourne and Richardson 1988:10). Under this theoretical framework, converts
seek to construct their own subjective realities that depend on factors such as status and power
hierarchies, degrees of continuity with other socialization experiences, and resource and
opportunity structures (Kilbourne and Richardson 1988). Therefore, religious conversion is
understood as a form of socialization in which individuals learns the norms of a religious group,
adopt the beliefs and values of a group, and develop a new social identity from their new group
membership (Greil and Rudy 1984; Kilbourne and Richardson 1988; Machalek and Snow 1985).
As income and economic mobility are closely related to one’s community, capital (fiscal, human,
and social), and socialization, I predict that there will be a relationship between income and
religious affiliation. As socio-economic status influences the social networks and communities
one engages with (or strives to interact with), I predict that economic mobility will lead people to
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change religious affiliations once they enter adulthood. Whether it be to switch to a religious
preference whose community, members, and social ties more closely match one’s own in terms
of income (and the other forms of capital that come with it), or to abandon religion altogether as
the quality of interaction, opportunities, and resources of the religious faith from one’s youth no
longer serve a purpose as one’s family income changes over time, I anticipate that income and
economic mobility will affect religious mobility.
LITERATURE REVIEW
According to Stark and Bainbridge’s (1985) secularization thesis, as societies develop,
religion becomes less important. Yet, what aspects of societal "development," lead to religious
mobility and apostasy? Under theoretical frameworks of conversion that suggest sociological
concepts and institutions affect religious mobility and religiosity, literature on religious mobility
is rich with patterns and predictors of religious mobility and religiosity around the globe.
Generally, literature on the topic of religious mobility highlights how demographic
characteristics (like race, gender, age, and sex), interreligious marriage (exogamy), geographic
mobility, and origin/destination religious affiliations affect religious conversion. While little
research has been done in the United States on the direct impact of income and economic
mobility on religious mobility, studies from around the globe suggest that there is a significant
relationship between income and religion that prompts this study.
Religious Preferences, Denominations, and Religious Mobility
Research on religious mobility recognizes how some religious groups experience more
in-group or out-group membership rates due to religious switching than others (Ellison and
Sherkat 1970; Lofland and Stark 1965; Loveland 2003; Newport 1979; Parrucci 1968; Sherkat
1991, 2001, 2002; Sherkat and Wilson 1995). Musick and Wilson (1995) find that the likelihood
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of switching religion is influenced by both the retentiveness of the denomination of origin and
the attractiveness of the destined denomination. For example, the higher the membership of
denomination, the greater likelihood of individuals converting to that denomination due to
network ties (Whitt and Babchuk 1992). Similarly, groups that have more distinctive traditions
and strict practices (Loveland 2003; Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 1987), and groups with ethnic
ties (Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990; Sherkat and Wilson 1995; Sherkat 1997) have greater
retention rates of membership. According to previous studies, Catholics and Baptists appear to
have the highest rates of retention rates in the United States (Loveland 2003; Newport 1979). If
individuals do convert, they are likely to switch interdenominationally or to a religious
preference similar to their original group (Sherkat and Wilson 1995), unless for marriage reasons
(Musick and Wilson 1995). While significant, origin and destination religious affiliations do not
fully account for or predict religious mobility; other contextual and structural factors, other than
denomination size, may lead to religious conversion (Loveland 2003; Newport 1979; Sherkat
1993).
The Effects of Demographic Variables on Religious Mobility
Sociological research on conversion offers various motivators of religious conversion
(Loveland 2003; Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990; Sherkat 1997, 2001). Research on indicators of
religious mobility suggests that occupational and geographic mobility, specific denomination,
exogamy, education, sex, race and generation (in terms of age cohort) correlate with religious
mobility (Alston 1971; Lauer 1975; Loveland 2003; Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990; Sherkat
1991). Regarding sex3, research on sex differences, like socioeconomic status, of religious
mobility is mixed (Hayes 1996; Roof and McKinney 1989). Yet, males tend to be more likely to
be religious mobile than females (Hayes 1996). For the most part, however, gender does not have
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a heavy impact on religious mobility outside of marriage reasons (Alston 1971; Glenn 1982;
Loveland 2003; Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990). When switching for marriage reasons, religious
switchers tend to be female (Alston 1971). Additionally when the rates of mobility between men
and women were found to be similar, the processes of religious mobility were different
(Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990). Men were most affected by changes in family status that led to
religious conversion and women were more affected by their denomination of origin
(Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990). This suggests that women’s drive to switch religions is shaped
by deep-rooted religious practices/beliefs and contemporary facets, such as current family
structure, drive men to convert (Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990). Sandomirsky and Wilson
(1990) posit that the reason for the discrepancy between the rate and processes of religious
disaffiliation between men and women is because the timeline for religious conversion in
relation to stages of family events and development is different for men and women, which
would lead men and women to convert at different ages.
Corresponding with theories of secularization (Stark and Bainbridge 1985), high degrees
of education increase the probability of religious mobility and decreases participation in religious
practices (Buser 2015; Lauer 1975). Despite the positive correlation between age and years of
education, studies show that older individuals are more religiously stable than younger
individuals, net of other factors (Hadaway, Marler, and Chaves 1993; Hayes 1996; Loveland
2003; Newport 1979). In regards to race, theory on religious mobility has been predominantly
focused on white denominations (Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990) and has not looked closely at
patterns of religious mobility for Black Americans (Ellison and Sherkat 1990).
Once examined, Black Americans are less likely to switch religions than white
Americans (Ellison and Sherkat 1990; Loveland 2003). In their study on the prevalence of self-

10

ECONOMIC MOBILITY AND RELIGIOUS MOBILITY

reported religious and spiritual identity in a sample of African American adults, Williams et al.
(2015) found that 95 percent of the sample identified as religious, spiritual, or both, which
reflected the importance of religiosity in African American heritage and culture in this sample.
When religious or spiritual identity change was present, it was concentrated with participants
with lower socioeconomic statuses (SES), further suggesting the relationship between religious
mobility and SES that serves as one of the foundations for this study (Williams et al. 2015).
Similarly, Ellison and Sherkat (1990) find relative stability among Black religious groups.
However, like white cohorts (Hout and Fischer 2002), the proportion of African Americans who
are apostates is increasing; these tend to be younger males residing in urban areas where facets of
black religion are gradually diminishing value in “competition [with] secular lifestyles,
organizations, and worldviews” (Ellison and Sherkat 1990:564; Frazier 1974). Additionally,
Ellison and Sherkat (1990:564) found a rising proportion of African Americans reporting
conservative denominational preferences, which, they argued, was because conservative
churches offered opportunities for social integration in “response to the rootlessness and
structural isolation of inner-city life.” Both of these central findings further illustrate how
religion serves non-religious functions for individuals, which imply that individual
characteristics and life outcomes impact religious preferences.
Exogamy and Religious Mobility
Religious switching is often associated with exogamous marriage (Cavan 1970; Johnson
1980; Loveland 2003; Musick and Wilson 1995). Further, Cavan (1970:319) emphasizes that
religious intermarriage is “so common a practice now that it should be accepted as a minor but
normal type of marriage, a part of the total social pattern of marriage, capable of analysis by
accepted sociological concepts and theories.” Religious switching for marriage reasons is
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generally characterized as a way to harmonize a marriage (Cavan 1970; Musick and Wilson
1995). Literature on religious mobility for marriage reasons suggests that both the original
religious affiliation and the destined affiliation have push and pull factors that influence the
decision to switch to a spouse’s religion (Musick and Wilson 1995). Certain groups may
emphasize religious homogeneity within unions more than others, or some destined religious
affiliations may be more lucrative (in terms of social, cultural, or economic elements) to the
switcher (Musick and Wilson 1995). Additionally, overlaps between family and social ties at
churches lessens the chances of finding a spouse of a different religion, meaning that
conservative religious groups have less of an opportunity to take part in exogamy. Yet, stricter,
conservative religious affiliations may have more pull in the marriage market for religious
mobility because they emphasize religious homogeneity between spouses (Musick and Wilson
1995). Musick and Wilson (1995:268) argue that religious switching for marriage reasons “alters
the terrain over which religious mobility take place,” in which conceptualizing religious mobility
in married populations without considering the “barriers” marriage creates is limiting. For
example, the expectation within certain religious affiliations to marry within the group may lead
to less exogamous marriage across religious faiths, but more exogamy interdenominationally
(Musick and Wilson 1995).
Newport (1979) found that while female respondents completed the majority of switching
due to marriage reasons, both male and female individuals switched religions to that of their
spouse, and in some cases both spouses had switched religions to the same destination faith.
Liberal Protestant groups are more likely to switch to more moderate or conservative protestant
groups for marriage reasons (Musick and Wilson 1995), and Liturgical Protestant groups (e.g.
Episcopalians) are more likely to switch to Roman Catholicism for marriage reasons than other
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reasons (Musick and Wilson 1995). Conversely, more conservative groups (e.g. Mormons) are
less likely to switch to Roman Catholicism for marriage reasons than for other reasons (Musick
and Wilson 1995). Roman Catholics on the other hand are more likely to become apostates than
convert to a spouse’s Protestant faith if they are switching for marriage reasons (Musick and
Wilson 1995). When switching for marriage reasons across faiths, the positive effects of
education on religious mobility minimize (Musick and Wilson 1995).
Musick and Wilson (1995:269) “cautiously” conclude “switching for marriage is an
occasion to break out of conventional circuits of mobility -- liberals become more conservative,
conservatives become more liberal.” In contrast to Iannaccone (1990), who posits that the
likelihood of switching religious groups increases the more similar to groups are, Musick and
Wilson (1995) find that switching for marriage reasons actually increases the distance over
which religious moves occur. Literature on interreligious marriage suggests that norms of
endogamy, while they still persist, do not have as strong a hold on religious affiliation
membership (Cavan 1970; Glenn 1982; Musick and Wilson 1995). Yet, high levels of
interreligious marriage also suggest that there is a cultural norm of religious preferences to agree
between spouses (Glenn 1982). Furthermore, the willingness to switch religions for marriage
reasons is demonstrative of the secularization of the institution of marriage in the United States
where religious institutions have a weak influence over marital choices (Glenn 1982).
Income and Religious Mobility
Research on the direction of the effect of income on religious mobility is divided (Alston
1971; Joshanloo and Weijers 2016; Hadaway 1991). While Roof and McKinney (1989) and
Newport (1979) find that upwardly mobile individuals are more religiously mobile, Sherkat
(1991) and Roof and Hadaway (1977) do not find evidence to support this theory. Yet, given the
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difference between which religious affiliations have the most in and out-group mobility rates,
previous literature suggests that socioeconomic status may influence religious mobility (Alston
1971; Newport 1979, Roof and Hadaway 1979). Newport (1979) argues that because religious
groups develop to serve certain socioeconomic groups, individuals may choose to belong to
certain affiliations that have values, networks, and opportunities that more closely mirror the
individual's level of education, occupation/occupational status, and income. Thus, individuals
who experience economic mobility tend to shift denominations to one that is more congruous
between their social statuses (Hayes 1996). Moreover, religious groups provide members with
nonreligious benefits such as social and human capital, which influence religious preference
(Ellison and Sherkat 1995, 1995). Therefore, religious switching may lead to social rewards that,
in-turn, affect the decision of the individual to convert (Sherkat 2001).
According to the Lofland and Stark (1965) model of conversion, predisposing personality
traits, social attributes, and situational factors induce types of tension that lead to conversion
(Lofland and Stark 1965; Sherkat 1991; Snow and Machalek 1984); such situational factors
include “marital strain, the loss of a family member, change or loss of a job, the pressures of
higher education” (Snow and Machalek 1984:181). Similarly, Lofland and Stark (1965:864)
specify the following example, among others, of tension: “longing for unrealized wealth,
knowledge, fame, and prestige." This finding suggests that downward mobility, low income, and
poor life chances may leave individuals, or "seekers" as Straus (1971) terms, searching for
change, which may manifest in the form of religious conversion.
In their study on whether religiosity moderates the relationship between income
inequality and life satisfaction, Joshanloo and Weijers (2016:731) found that religiosity
“mitigates the negative influence of income inequality on life satisfactions.” Furthermore, it is
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religious belief, not religious practice, which serves this purpose. Joshanloo and Weijers (2016)
illustrate that there is a relationship between religion and income where religious practices are
influenced by income inequality. Whether to buffer negative life circumstances such as income
inequality or to gain access to social networks that mirror economic status, there appears to be
relationship between income, economic mobility and religiosity, religion, and religious mobility
(Alston 1971; Buser 2015; Joshanloo and Weijers 2016). Following the same religiosity-stressbuffer framework of Joshanloo and Weiger (2016), Storm (2017:146) finds that “lower income,
GDP, and social welfare availability in Europe are associated with more religiosity, and
increases in social security through government welfare expenditure reduces country levels of
religiosity” over a twelve-year period.
In his 1971 article on religious mobility, Jon P. Alston uses data from a national survey of
the adult American population from 1955 to analyze changes in religious membership for a
group of white respondents. Alston (1971:140) defines religious mobility as “the change from
one denomination to another, one major religious group to another or from a status of ‘no
religion’ to any religious membership (as well as the reverse).” Alston (1971:141) also finds that
of the denominations who had a higher percentage of mobile members, “these three
denominations are also highest in family income, occupational SES, and education,” while those
denominations with lower socioeconomic variables have less religiously mobile members.
Alston (1971) posits that one reason behind this trend is that the upwardly mobile (in terms of
income) are attracted to higher status Protestant denominations. Similarly, Lauer (1975) found
that the majority of the religiously mobile in his sample moved into high status Protestant
denomination or out of faith altogether. This finding suggests that religious mobility is related to
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the attractiveness of higher status denominations and that religious apostasy relates to upward
mobility.
Similarly, Newport (1979:546) found that individuals who were “occupationally
upwardly mobile are more likely to have been religious mobile than those individuals either
occupationally stable, or occupationally downwardly mobile.” As occupational mobility often
coincides with economic mobility, this finding suggests that those who are upwardly mobile in
terms of income will also be more likely to be religiously mobile. Newport (1979) also found
that the average income for those individuals who switched religions more closely matched the
average income for their religion of destination and not their religion of origin. Newport (1979)
finds a positive relationship between the socioeconomic statuses of switchers and the average
status of the destination religious affiliation for these switchers, which suggests that individuals
were switching religions for socioeconomic status compatibility. Additionally, those who are
upwardly mobile have not only shown to be more religiously mobile, but also more likely to
switch out of religion altogether (Roof and Hadaway 1979; Loveland 2003; Newport 1979).
Buser (2015) found that moderate differences in income had significant effects on the
number of times families attended religious services and the kind of church that they attended. A
higher income was positively related to frequency of religious service attendance and increased
the likelihood of joining Evangelical communities (Buser 2015). Buser (2015) argues that church
activities and communities, like Evangelical communities, may have been previously unavailable
to less affluent families (because of an emphasis on donation or other cultural, monetary aspects
of religion), which is why income and religious service attendance are positively correlated.
While Buser’s (2015) results show that higher income leads to more religious
participation, he notes that cross-country studies show that national income is negatively
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correlated with religious participation. In reconciliation of these two diverging findings, Buser
(2015) posits that as societies develop, the national income rises with the average level of
education, and it is the combination of the two that leads to less religiousness. Buser’s (2015)
findings suggest that there is a significant relationship, regardless of the direction, between
income and religious affiliation. Buser’s (2015) article highlights the monetary aspects of
religion that make religiousness costly in time and money, which could influence religious
mobility. Yet, income is not the only explanatory factor for religious mobility (Newport 1979).
Given the literature on religious mobility in and outside of the United States, I expect the
following factors to be significant predictors of religious mobility: economic mobility, higher
income, exogamy, more years of education, being younger, and being female; in contrast, I
expect being a person of color, being older, being male, being endogamous, having a lower
income, and not experiencing economic mobility to be predictive of religious stability (Alston
1975; Buser 2015; Glenn 1982; Loveland 2003; Musick and Wilson 1995; Sandomirsky and
Wilson 1990; Sherkat 1991, 1993).
DATA & METHODS
Using the individual as my unit of analysis, I rely on General Social Survey (GSS) data
from the year 2016 to measure religious mobility and apostasy in the United States. The General
Social Survey (GSS) is a national survey administered across the United States vastly through
face-to-face interviews.1 The population of the GSS are randomly selected respondents (18+
adults) living in households in the United States, who speak English or Spanish,2 are not residing
in institutions (e.g. prison or university), and do not have mental and/or physical conditions that
would prevent them from completing the survey. In the year 2016, the response rate for the GSS
1

Computer-assisted interviewing (CAPI) began in 2002; under conditions where an in-person interview with a
sampled respondent cannot take place, GSS interviews are conducted by telephone.
2
From 2006 to present the GSS has included those able to do complete the survey in English or Spanish
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was about 61 percent yielding a total sample of 2,867 respondents. For the purposes of my study,
I use a subset of only married respondents from the 2016 GSS data file, which left me with a
sample of 1,068 total respondents. For further information on how the data were collected, visit
the website of the General Social Survey.3 While the GSS did not administer the religion and
culture modules (Loveland 2003) in the year of interest for this study‒ 2016‒ the GSS regularly
administers survey questions considered to be a part of the “GSS replicating core” that cover
background information on respondents, including their religious affiliation. In addition to the
respondent’s religious affiliation, the 2016 GSS includes other questions of interest for this study
such as: the religion in which the respondent was raised, their race, sex, age, income, their
spouse’s religious preference, number of years of education, whether or not they have been
geographically mobile since the age of 16, and what their estimated family income was at the age
of 16.
My dependent variable, religious mobility, measures whether or not a respondent has
switched religious affiliations from the one in which they were raised. In order to measure
religious mobility I compared the respondent's response to what their religious preference is
currently and the religion they report having been raised. The GSS asks respondents the
following two questions: "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish,
some other religion, or no religion?" and, "In what religion were you raised?". Using these two
variables in the 2016 GSS, I can see which respondents report a different religious affiliation
since entering adulthood. To measure this, I created a dichotomous variable coded 1 for
individuals whose religious preference in 2016 is different from the religion in which they were
raised and 0 for those whose religious preference has remained constant. If the respondent
replied ‘None’ in response to the question of their current religious preference and they were
3

http://gss.norc.org/
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raised with a religious affiliation other than ‘None’, they have abandoned religion altogether as
they entered adulthood and are coded as a 1 for a dummy variable of my creation that measures
apostasy. If the respondent replied ‘None’ in response to the question in which religion were they
raised and listed a religious preference other than ‘None’ in 2016, they have been coded as 1 for
another dummy variable of my creation, which denotes respondents who have joined a religious
affiliation in 2016 from not having been raised with any of the other listed affiliations on the
GSS. Respondents who were coded as ‘Don’t know’ or ‘No answer’ in response to their current
religious preference or the religion in which they were raised are counted as missing cases.
My independent variables, income and economic mobility, are measured using two
variables in the GSS; the first asks the respondents:
In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year -2015 -- before taxes, that is. Just tell me the letter. Total income includes interest or
dividends, rent, Social Security, other pensions, alimony or child support, unemployment
compensation, public aid (welfare), armed forces or veteran's allotment.
This variable is the independent variable for testing my second hypothesis that if the
respondent was raised with a religious affiliation other than ‘none’ and their total family income
is above the average family income of 2016, they will report ‘none’ for their religious preference
in 2016. To test my first hypothesis, I compare the responses between the respondent's total
family income in 2016 and their estimated family income at age 16. The latter variables asks:
Thinking about the time when you were 16 years old, compared with American families
in general then, would you say your family income was--far below average, below
average, average, above average, or far above average?
In order to appropriately divide the total family income variable in 2016 into the five
categories of the respondent's family income when they were 16 years old (far below average,
below average, average, above average, and far above average), I used U.S. Census Data on
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household income dispersion in the year 20164 to determine what the average family income was
in 2016. I then used the U.S. Census income percentiles in 2016 to divide the rest of the GSS
2016 family income variable. I define respondents whose family income in 2016 is more than
their estimated family income at age 16 as upwardly mobile. Respondents whose family income
in 2016 is less than their estimated family income at age 16 are considered to be downwardly
mobile.
In addition to my independent variables, I controlled for the effect of other variables that
literature on religious mobility and religiousness suggests affect religious mobility. My control
variables are:
-age
-sex (dummied)
-race (dummied)
-exogamy (interreligious marriage)
-geographic mobility (different city/state since age of 16)
-education (number of years of education).
I dummied the demographic control variables as follows: respondents who are female are
coded as 1 and respondents who are ‘Black’ or ‘Other’ are coded as 1. To measure exogamy I
compared the religion in which the respondent was raised and the religious preference of the
respondent's spouse. If the religious preference of their spouse is different from the religion in
which they were raised, then the respondent is coded as a 1 for a variable of my creation called
‘exogamy’ that denotes interreligious marriage. To measure geographic mobility I used the GSS
variable which asks, “when you were 16 years old, were you living in this same
(city/town/county)?”. Respondents who are coded as ‘Same [state], [different] city,’ or ‘Different
4

See Table A-2 of household income dispersion from www.census.gov
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state’ are given a value of 1 for a variable of my creation that denotes that the respondent has
moved to a different city or state than the one in which they were living at the age of 16. To
measure the influence of education on religious mobility, I use the education variable on the GSS
that denotes the number of years of school completed by the respondent.
I have chosen to limit my dependent variable of religious mobility to those who have
switched between major religious groups— the first religious preference question in the GSS—
and exclude denominational switching. Additionally, I have chosen to exclude those respondents
who are not married in order to clearly see the effects of exogamy over religious mobility in
2016.
FINDINGS
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of respondents’ total family income at age 16.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]

The majority of respondents estimated that their total family income at the age of 16, in
comparison to other American families, was average. Additionally, Figure 1 reveals that 38
percent of respondents estimated that their family income fell below average when they were 16
in comparison to the 20 percent that estimated their family income at age 16 to be above average.
Figure 2 depicts the total family income distribution for respondents in the year 2016.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]

The income distribution is divided into five categories that denote total family incomes as
follows: Far below average $0-$12,499; Below average $12,500-$39,999; Average $40,000$74,999; Above average $75,000-$169,999; Far above average $170,000 or over. In contrast to
Figure 1, Figure 2 illustrates that more than fifty percent of respondents' total family income in
2016 is above average in comparison to 18 percent of respondents' whose family income fell
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below average for the year 2016. In figure 1, the majority of respondents fell into the above
average category, meaning that they had a total family income between $75,000 and $169,999.
Figure 3 illustrates the number of respondents whose total family income in 2016 falls
into a different category (far below average, below average, average, above average, far above
average) than their estimated family income at age 16, which indicates that they are
economically mobile.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]

Figure 3 shows that 73 percent of the sample is considered to be economically mobile,
while nearly 27 percent of respondents have a total family income in 2016 of equal categorical
value to their estimated family income at age 16.
Figure 4 depicts the percentage of respondents who list one of twelve religions as the
religion in which they were raised.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]

The majority of respondents (52.8%) answered Protestant as the religion in which they
were raised. "Catholic" (33.1%) and "None" (8.1%) follow "Protestant" as the next most frequent
responses to this question on the GSS. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of current religious
preferences for respondents in the year 2016.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]

Correspondingly to Figure 4, Figure 5 yields a modal response of "Protestant" (51.3%)
for respondents' religious preference, followed by "Catholic" (24.2%) and "None" (18.2%).
Figure 6 illustrates the number of respondents whose current religious preference in 2016 is
different from the religion in which they were raised, indicating that they are religiously mobile.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
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Figure 6 shows that the majority of the sample has not switched religions as they entered
adulthood and that only approximately 29 percent of respondents are religiously mobile. Figure 7
illustrates the number of respondents who have spouses with a different religion from the one in
which the respondent was raised, indicating that the respondent is exogamous.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]

Here, nearly 42 percent of the sample is exogamous and nearly 59 percent of respondents
have married within the religion in which they were raised. Figure 8 depicts the number of
respondents who were living in a different state or city since the age of 16 from the one in which
they currently reside.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]

Figure 8 shows that 68 percent of respondents have been geographically mobile, while 32
percent of respondents have resided in the same city since the age of 16. Figure 9 depicts the
percent distribution for years of education within this sample.
[Insert Figure 9 about here]

Figure 9 yields a negatively skewed distribution; the majority of respondents (25.7%) are
high school graduates, having completed 12 years of education. Likewise, the next most frequent
number of years of education for respondents in this sample are: 16 (21.7%), 14 (11.9%), and 13
years of education (7.5%).
[Insert Figure 10 about here]

Figure 10 illustrates racial demographics of this sample. Here, 82 percent of respondents
are white, nearly 10 percent are Black, and approximately eight percent are coded as "other."
Figure 11 illustrates the sex distribution for this sample. Here, 52 percent of respondents are
female and 48 percent of respondents are male.
[Insert Figure 11 about here]
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Figure 12 depicts the age distribution for the sample. In this sample, the age of
respondents ranges from 19 years old to respondents 89 years of age or older. The highest
percentage frequency of the age of respondents is 52 years old, in which three percent of the
sample falls.
[Insert Figure 12 about here]
Table 1 gives the means, medians, and standard deviations for the variables of interest for
this study.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
On average, 73 percent of the sample is considered to be economically mobile.
Additionally, over half (54%) of the sample has a total family income of $75,000 or above on
average in the year 2016. On average, only 29 percent of the sample is considered to be
religiously mobile. Additionally, on average, 41 percent of respondents are considered to be
exogamous and 68 percent have been geographically mobile since the age of 16. On average,
respondents have completed about 14 years of education with a standard deviation of 3 years of
education. One average, only 18 percent of the sample is a person of color and 52 percent of
respondents are female. The distribution of age in this sample yields a mean age of about 50
years old with a standard deviation of almost 15 years.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
[Insert Figure 14 about here]
Figure 14 is a visualization of the cross tabulation of religion in which raised, religious
stability, mobility and apostasy displayed in Table 2. The most religiously stable religious
affiliations are Native American, Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic. The religious affiliations that
experience the most out-group movement due to religious conversion are: 'Other,' Christian, and
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'None.' While the visualization suggests some stark percentages of religious mobility & stability
(e.g. Native American), some of the religious affiliations in this sample have very few members
represented in the General Social Survey. For example, in this subset of married respondents,
there is only one Native American identifying respondent and only five Buddhist, Hindu, and
Orthodox-Christian respondents. Thus, the more representative religious affiliations (with
samples greater than 10) of interest in this cross tabulation are: Protestant, Catholic, None, and
Jewish. In regards to those respondents who were raised as Protestant, 80 percent still affiliate
with the Protestant faith and 20 percent have switched religions. Of that 20 percent of religiously
mobile respondents, almost 14 percent switched to identifying with no religion at all.
Respondents who were raised Catholic tended to be more religiously mobile than
Protestants with almost 35 percent switching out of Catholicism after entering adulthood.
Furthermore, nearly half of Catholic raised respondents who switched religions abandoned
religion altogether. Of the eighty-seven respondents who were raised without a religious
affiliation, a little over half joined a religious affiliation after entering adulthood. In contrast, all
of the respondents who switched out of the Jewish religious affiliation abandoned religion
altogether.
Table 3 is a correlation matrix between religious mobility, religious apostasy, and eight
independent variables that illustrates the relationships between all of the variables of interest.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 is the correlation matrix between religious mobility and eight variables
(economic mobility, income, exogamy, geographic mobility, years of education, age, sex, and
race). The table illustrates that there is no statistically significant correlation between economic
mobility and income with religious mobility. Additionally, years of education, being female, and
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being a person of color have no statistically significant correlations with religious mobility. In
contrast, exogamy and age have statistically significant relationships with religious mobility. At
the .01 level, age has a very weak, negative correlation (-.098) with religious mobility; this
means that there is relationship between being older and having not switched religions. Also at
the .01 level, exogamy has a strong, positive relationship (.557) to religious mobility; this
suggests that marrying outside of one's religious faith has a strong relationship with switching
religions. Income is weakly, positively correlated with economic mobility, meaning that those
who are economically mobile have higher incomes. Additionally, income is moderately,
positively related to the education variable, meaning that respondents with more years of
education have higher total family incomes. Income is negatively, weakly correlated with being a
person of color, meaning that on the average respondents of color in the sample have lower total
family incomes. Education is weakly, positively correlated with geographic mobility, where
respondents who have more years of education, on the average, are geographically mobile. Being
a person of color is negatively, weakly correlated with the education variable, which suggests
that people of color have less years of education on the average. Age is negatively, very weakly
correlated with being female, meaning that in this sample females, on the average, are younger.
In contrast to literature that suggests women live longer than men, because the sample is a subset
of only married respondents, this finding suggests that on the average men are marrying younger
women, skewing the age distribution of the sample.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Table 4 is the correlation matrix between religious apostasy and eight variables
(economic mobility, income, exogamy, geographic mobility, years of eucation, age, sex, and
race). The table illustrates that there is no statistically significant correlation between economic
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mobility and religious apostasy. However, at the .01 level, there is a statistically significant,
weak correlation between income and religious apostasy. Here, there is a very weak relationship
between having a higher income and abandoning the religion in which one was raised.
Additionally, age has a statistically significant relationship with religious apostasy at the .01
level. Similar to the findings from Table 2, there is a weak relationship between being of older
age and choosing to convert to another religious affiliation other than 'none.' Moreover, Table 3
demonstrates a moderate, positive relationship between religious apostasy and exogamy, which
suggests that those who marry outside of their faith are more likely to be apostates than those
who are religiously endogamous. At the .05 level, education has a weak, statistically significant
relationship religious apostasy that suggests that respondents who have more years of education
or more likely to be religious apostates.
As evidenced in both correlation matrices, economic mobility has a statistically
significant, weak relationship with income at the .01 level meaning that those with higher
incomes are more likely to be economically mobile. Also at the .01 level of significance, there is
a very weak relationship between geographic mobility and economic mobility. The causation of
this relationship is difficult to discern from this table as one could argue that those who are
economically mobile, in particular those who are upwardly mobile, will be more likely to be
geographically mobile and vice-versa. At the .05 level, economic mobility has a very weak,
negative relationship with exogamy that suggests those who are economically mobile are less
likely to marry outside of the religion in which they were raised. At the .01 level, there are
significant relationships between income, education, and race. In regards to education, there is a
moderate association between those with more years of education and having a higher total
family income. Further, if the respondent is a person of color, they are likely to have a lower
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income given the weak relationship between income and race. Likewise, there is a statistically
significant weak, negative relationship between race and education. Also at the .01 level of
significance, the correlation matrices illustrate weak, negative associations between age and sex,
and age and race. In this sample, female and nonwhite respondents are younger than their male
and white counterparts.
Table 5 is a logistic regression of religious mobility on all predictors (economic mobility,
income, exogamy, geographic mobility, education, age, race, and sex).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Using the Cox & Snell Pseudo R2, 29 percent of the variability in religious mobility can
be explained by these variables at the .01 level. In contrast to my hypothesis, neither economic
mobility nor having an above average income were statistically significant predictors of religious
mobility. Rather, the only statistically significant predictor of religious mobility in this model is
exogamy. Those who are exogamous, meaning that they have married outside of the religious
affiliation in which they were raised, are almost nineteen times as likely to be religiously mobile
than those who are endogamous. I find similar results in Table 4, which is a logistic regression of
religious apostasy on all predictors (economic mobility, income, exogamy, geographic mobility,
education, age, race, and sex).
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Using the Cox & Snell Pseudo R2, 11 percent of the variability in religious
apostasy can be explained by these variables at the .01 level. Similar to the results displayed in
Table 3, none of the economic predictors had any statistically significant effect on religious
apostasy. Additionally, having been geographically mobile, being a high school dropout, a
person of color, or female did not have any statistically significant effects on religious mobility
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or apostasy. However, like religious mobility, exogamy has a statistically significant effect on
religious apostasy at the .01 level. Those who are exogamous are almost eight times as likely to
abandon the religion in which they were raised and choose to identify with no religion than those
who are endogamous. Additionally, age has a statistically significant effect on religious apostasy
where those who are older are less likely to abandon a religious affiliation than those of a
younger age. Both of the regression models confirm the results of the multivariate analysis in
Table 2 as the relationships between only exogamy, age, and religious mobility/apostasy are
significant. The regression results refute my hypotheses that economic mobility and income
would have an effect on religious mobility and apostasy.
DISCUSSION
Similar to the conclusion of Hayes (1996), the majority of the sample continues to
identify with the religious affiliation in which they were raised. Mirroring the frequency of
religious mobility in previous studies (Loveland 2003), almost 30 percent of my sample is
religiously mobile. In contrast, the majority of my sample is economically mobile. At the age of
16, nearly 38 percent of the sample estimated that their family income fell below average in
comparison to other families in the United States. In contrast, only 18 percent of respondents’
total family income in 2016 fell below average. Correspondingly, the percentage of respondents
whose total family income in 2016 fell above the average increased by 33 percent from the
percentage of respondents whose family income fell above average when they were 16. While
the measurement of total family income at age 16 is subjective and arguably arbitrary, these
findings suggest that the majority of this sample is ‘better off,’ economically speaking, in 2016
than they were at the age of 16. In regards to other socio-demographic variables such as
education, race, sex, and age, this sample is comprised of largely white, female, high-school
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graduates who, on average, falls between fifty and fifty-one years of age. Given that the majority
of the sample, on average, also had family incomes of $75,000 or above, we can conclude that
the sample is relatively well off, socioeconomically speaking, in the United States. Through the
lens of a social-environmental determinism framework of religious conversion (Kilbourne and
Richardson 1988), in which negative life outcomes act as forms of tension that leave individuals
vulnerable to religious conversion (Lofland and Stark 1965), the implication of a largely
upwardly mobile sample is that because less economic distress is present, we might expect to see
less individuals switching religions for economic reasons.
When looking at the frequency distributions of the religions in which respondents were
raised and their current affiliations, the general distributions are similar: the highest percentage
of respondents fall into the Protestant religion in both categories, followed by Catholics, None,
and Jewish. Yet, when looking at how these distributions shift for each of these religions in terms
of religious mobility, we can see the in and out-group membership rates. The Protestant group
appears to have very little out-group membership loss (only one percent), while the Catholic
group drops by almost 10 percent. In contrast, both the Jewish and no religious affiliations
appear to gain members. The Jewish group hardly increases (less than one percent), but the
“None” category increases by a slightly more than 10 percent.
In contrast to findings that Catholics have the highest rates of retention (Loveland 2003;
Newport 1979), Catholic membership in this sample drops significantly. What might explain this
finding is Musick and Wilson’s (1995:270) argument that switching for marriage reasons
“increases the impact of religious versus secular variables, increases the distance over which
religious moves occur, and increases the chances of mobility out of the theological groups to
which is normally confined.” Thus, because I am using a subset of only married respondents, it is
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possible that the denominations we might expect to have higher retention rates may lose more
members due to marriage reasons. While the Jewish category increased by less than one percent,
it is notable that of those who were raised Jewish and no longer identify as Jewish, 100 percent
of them identify with no religious affiliation in 2016. Thus, instead of switching to a new
religion, Jewish raised respondents opt out of religion altogether. This finding links with the 10
percent increase in the “None” category in 2016. Echoing the concerns of Hout and Fischer
(2002), the increase of the ‘nones’ is prevalent in this study. Further, we see trends across the
board of those who are religiously mobile that suggest one has about a fifty-fifty chance of
adopting a new religious faith or opting out of religion altogether when they choose to switch out
of the religious affiliation of their youth.
In regards to the correlation matrices that revealed no statistically significant relationship
between religious mobility or apostasy with income or economic mobility, some variables that
were significantly associated with religious mobility and apostasy did not have relationships that
were sustained in either regression model. For example, at the .01 level, age was negatively
correlated with religious mobility. Given the weakness of this relationship, it is not surprising
that it did not persist in the regression model for religious mobility. However, age had a slightly
weaker, statistically significant relationship with religious apostasy at the .01 level in the
correlation matrix that did persist in the logistic regression model. This suggests that if one
decides to abandon the religion in which they were raised, their age is more closely tied to the
choice to opt out of religion altogether. Therefore, the younger one is when they decide to switch
religious affiliations, the more likely they are to be religious apostates. This finding too speaks to
the rising of the “nones” (Hout and Fischer 2002) in the last two decades. While the United
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States remains a highly religious country, these findings beg the question of whether or not this
will remain the case in the next fifty years for future generations as these younger cohorts age.
The only variable that had a sustained, statistically significant association with both
religious mobility and apostasy at the .01 level was exogamy. Given the literature on
interreligious marriage (Cavan 1970; Johnson 1980; Musick and Wilson 1995), this result is not
surprising. Corroborating the social-interactionist notion that social interaction and degree of
community leads to religious mobility, exogamy is a heavily predictive variable for both
mobility and apostasy. Interestingly, the effects of exogamy on religious mobility are twice as
much as the predictive effects of interreligious marriage on religious apostasy. This suggests that
when switching for marriage reasons, unlike with age, respondents are more likely to be
switching to another religious affiliation instead of abandon religion altogether. Perhaps, as
Musick and Wilson (1995) posit, interreligious marriage serves as an opportunity to break out of
the “conventional circuits of mobility,” (269) which would lead spouses to attempt to partake in
the benefits of another religious affiliation as opposed to opting out of religion. Further,
individuals are likely to adopt the religious affiliation of their spouse when switching for
marriage reasons (Glenn 1982; Musick and Wilson 1995).
This study substantiates Cavan's (1970) argument that “religious intermarriage is so
common a practice now that it should be accepted as a minor but normal type of marriage, a part
of the total social pattern of marriage, capable of analysis by accepted sociological concepts and
theories” (319). Regardless of the effect of intermarriage over religious mobility and apostasy,
this study illustrates the prevalence of religious exogamy in the United States. Just as Cavan
(1970) argues that exogamy is an increasingly common occurrence in the United States, nearly
half of this sample is married to a spouse of a different religious affiliation than the one in which
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they were raised. Further, under the sociological interactionist theoretical framework, this study
evidences how social interaction and social institutions like marriage are deeply tied to identity
and can be analyzed as such.
Primarily this study is concerned with the effects of different variables on whether or not
one switches to a different religious affiliation than the one of their youth, or chooses to abandon
religion altogether. Broadly speaking, this study is concerned with issue of identity: how we
choose to identify ourselves, and how those identities change throughout a lifetime. Under the
theoretical framework of social interactionism, this study illustrates how social interactions shape
identity (e.g. the decision to adopt a different religion for marriage reasons) and how identity
shapes the communities, people, and institutions (e.g. churches) individuals have access to.
CONCLUSION
The central question of interest for this study is what leads individuals to switch religions
from the ones in which they were raised; further, what leads individuals to not only switch
religions, but abandon religion altogether after having entered adulthood. The purpose of this
study is to assess the extent to which, if any, income and economic mobility influence religious
conversion. In order to measure the effects of economic mobility and income on religious
mobility I ran statistical analyses on a sample of married respondents from the 2016 General
Social Survey (GSS). Under the interactionist theoretical framework of religious conversion, I
hypothesized that:
1) Respondents whose total family income in 2016 has a different value than their
estimated family income when they were 16 will be more likely to report a different religious
affiliation than the one in which they were raised than those who do not report different values of
family income from when they were 16 and in 2016;
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And, 2) if the respondent was raised with a religious affiliation and their total family
income is above the average family income of 2016, they will report ‘none’ for their religious
preference in 2016.
My results do not support either hypothesis. Neither economic mobility nor having an
above average total family income had any statistically significant effects on religious mobility
or apostasy. However, my findings support the interactionist theoretical framework as exogamy
surfaced as a significant predictor of both religious mobility and religious apostasy. Additionally,
the effects of age on religious apostasy supported the literature regarding the relationship
between age and religious affiliation (Hadaway, Marler, and Chaves 1993; Hayes 1996;
Loveland 2003; Newport 1979).
One of the limitations of my study is that it does not address the more intrinsic,
intraindividual levels of analysis regarding religious conversion. For example, the measures I
used to measure religious mobility only measure the mobility of religious affiliation
identification and do not measure the religiosity or spirituality of respondents. That is to say that
identifying oneself as Jewish is different from observing Shabbat and attending services every
week. Not only does my study not measure the religiosity of those affiliating with a religious
group like Judaism, but it does not measure the religiosity or spirituality of those choosing to
affiliate with no religious preference in 2016; while the "nones" in my sample may not be
specifying any religious affiliation, it is possible that those with no religious affiliation continue
to religious or spiritual in some way. Another limitation in my research design is how I coded my
economic mobility variable; given the way the General Social Survey codes the income variable
(ordinally), my division of economic mobility into five categories (very below average, below
average, average, above average, very above average) using percentiles from 2016 U.S. Census
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data on household income is not an exact representation of economic mobility in the United
States. Additionally, by using a subset of the GSS I reduced and skewed my sample significantly
(only married respondents, older respondents).
Another limitation of my research design is that I did not consider interdenominational
religious switching. While the literature finds evidence for support and rejection of the
importance of interdenominational switching as a form of conversion (Sherkat 2001; Wuthnow
1993), future research might want to examine the effects of income and economic mobility
across religious denominations. In particular, for historically higher and lower status
denominations of Protestantism (Lauer 1975), economic mobility and income yield statistically
significant relationships. Additionally, future research should examine the relationship between
religious identity and religiosity; further, research could attempt to discern which factors
contribute to being more religious (going to services more often, having a leadership role in the
religious group, etc.) than just identifying as an affiliation. Additionally, the question of the
unknown religiosity of the "nones" in my sample alludes to debates between religiosity and
spirituality and whether or not individuals are perhaps becoming less religious, but more
spiritual.
As I only examined married respondents in order to see the effects of exogamy on
religious mobility and apostasy, future research should investigate the effects of income and
economic mobility (and age, sex, race, education, and geographic mobility) on single
respondents; future research should delve into whether or not other variables emerge as
statistically significant for single respondents that do not, or are overshadowed by the effects of
exogamy, for married respondents. Further, research might find that a higher or lower percentage
of variability in religious mobility or apostasy can be explained by other variables for single
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respondents in comparison to the twenty-nine percent and explained by exogamy in my study.
Moreover, because I limited my analysis to a subset of older respondents, the average age is
quite high (around 50 years old), which encourages future research to look into the effects of the
variables in this study on a younger sample. Future research may also wish to attempt to answer
the question of 'who's marrying who' that we are left with at the conclusion of this study. Which
religious affiliations are driving religious conversion for marriage reasons? How do couples
decide which partner's religion is adopted by the other, or whether neither spouse's religious
affiliation is adopted at all? These questions embody the underlying structures, institutions, and
social interactions that contribute to the force of exogamy on religious mobility and apostasy that
may inspire future research.
Given the divided findings in the literature and theories of religious conversion, my
results corroborate that religious switching cannot be treated as one generic type (Glenn 1982;
Loveland 2003). While the central question of interest of my study was whether or not income
and economic mobility predicted religious mobility, I expected that most of my variables would
bear significantly on religious mobility. But this was not the case. Instead, we can only conclude
that exogamy is a key predictor of religious mobility and apostasy. Further, age is inversely
related to abandoning any religious affiliation. The implications of my findings are best suited
for interactionist theories of religious conversion. At the forefront of the interactionist theoretical
framework is social interaction and how individuals adapt and adjust to navigate social milieus.
My results support the notion that religious conversion is driven by social relationships and
communities generated through marriage. Furthermore, it appears that the bonds of marriage
eclipse the bonds of faith.
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Table 1. Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations for Variables (N=1068)
Variable
Mean
Median SD
Economic Mobility
0.73
1.00
0.444
$75,000 or Above Total Family Income
0.54
1.00
0.499
Religious Mobility
0.29
0.00
0.453
Exogamy
0.41
0.00
0.493
Geographic Mobility
0.68
1.00
0.466
Education (in years)
14.23
14.00
3.013
Age (in years)
50.60
51.00
14.964
Person of Color
0.18
0.00
0.384
Female
0.52
1.00
0.500

Table 2. Cross Tabulation of Religion in Which Raised and Religious Stability, Mobility, and Apostasy

Reli
gio
us
Mo
bilit
y

Protestant

Catholic

Jewish

None

Other

Buddhism

Hinduism

OrthodoxChristian
60.0%

Christian

60.0%

Moslem/
Islam
50.0%

40.0%

Native
American
100.0%

Religiously
Stable

80.1%

65.3%

85.0%

48.3%

0.0%

60.0%

Religiously
Mobile
No Religious
Preference

6.2%

17.5%

0.0%

51.7%

57.1%

20.0%

20.0%

20.0%

40.0%

30.0%

0.0%

13.7%

17.2%

15.0%

0.0%

42.9%

20.0%

20.0%

30.0%

0.0%

30.0%

0.0%

N

564

354

20

87

7

5

5

10

5

10

1

n = 1068; ! ! test, p<.001

Table 3. Correlations (r) between Religious Mobility and Eight Variables (listwise deletion, two-tailed test, n = 1068)
Variable
Economic Income
Exogamy
Geographic Education
Age
Female
Person of
Mobility
Mobility
Color

Religious
Mobility
Economic
Mobility
Income
Exogamy

.021

.053**

.557**

.076**

.058**

-.098**

.024**

.004**

.121**

-.068**

.083**

-.026**

.005**

.004**

.031**

.060**

.064**

.428**

.021**

-.047**

-.188**

.018**

.047**

-.067**

.062**

-.038**

.111**

.002**

.000**

.007**

-.034**

.036**

-.110**

-.088**

-.162**

Geographic
Mobility
Education
Age
Female
*p < .05; **p < .01

-.008**

Table 4. Correlations (r) between Religious Apostasy and Eight Variables (listwise deletion, two-tailed test, n = 1068)
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Variable

Economic
Mobility

Income

Religious
Apostasy

-.007

.081***
*

.315**

.043**

.078***

-.087**

-.053**

-.037**

.121**

-.068**

.083**

-.026**

.005**

.004**

.031**

.060**

.064**

.428**

.021**

-.047**

-.188**

.018**

.047**

-.067**

.062**

-.038**

.111**

.002**

.000**

.007**

-.034**

.036**

-.110**

-.088**

-.162**

Economic
Mobility
Income

Exogamy

Geographic
Mobility

Exogamy
Geographic
Mobility

Education

Education

Age

Age
Female
*p < .05; **p < .01

Economic Mobility

.396

.197

1.486

Above Average Income

.022

.178

1.023

2.929

.185

18.710**

Geographic Mobility

.435

.181

1.545

High School Dropout

.278

.288

1.321

-.014

.006

.986

.091

.223

1.095

-.091

.167

.913

-2.449

.394

.086

Age
Person of Color
Female
Constant
Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 = .290
**p < .01

Person of
Color

-.008**

Table 5. Logistic Regression of Religious Mobility on All Predictors (n = 1068)
Variable
B
S.E.
Exp(B)

Exogamy

Female
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Table 6. Logistic Regression of Religious Apostasy on All Predictors (n = 1068)
Variable
B
S.E.
Exp(B)
Economic Mobility

.240

.203

1.272

Above Average Income

.065

.221

1.067

1.996

.216

7.636**

Geographic Mobility

.266

.209

1.304

High School Dropout

.202

.321

1.223

Age

-.017

.007

.983**

Person of Color

-.325

.266

.723

Female

-.480

.190

.619

-2.213

.444

.109

Exogamy

Constant
Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 = .111
**p < .01

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Under $1,000 to $12,499

41.4%
27.7%

$12,500 to $39,999
19.2%

10.1%

$40,000 to $74,999
1.6%

$75,000 to $169,999
$170,000 or over

Far below Below Average Above Far above
average average
average average
Figure 1. Total Family Income at Age 16

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

2.8%

15.3%

28.2%

41.8%

Under $1,000 to $12,499
$12,500 to $39,999
12.0%

$40,000 to $74,999
$75,000 to $169,999

Far
Below Average Above
Far
below average
average above
average
average
Figure 2. Total Family Income 2016
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100%
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20%
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73.1%

26.9%

Economically Stable

Economically Mobile

Figure 3. Economic Mobility
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60.0% 52.8%
50.0%
33.1%
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Figure 4. Religion in Which Raised
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Figure 5. Respondent's Religious Preference
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Figure 6. Religious Mobility
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Figure 7. Exogamy
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Figure 8. Geographic Mobility
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Figure 9. Years of Education
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Figure 10. Race
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